Suchergebnisse

Social dilemmas such as greenhouse gas emission reduction are often characterized by heterogeneity in benefits from solving the dilemma. How should leadership of group members be organized in such a setting? We implement a laboratory public goods experiment with heterogeneous marginal per capita returns from the public good and leading by example that is either implemented exogenously or by self-selection. Our results suggest that both exogenous and selfselected leadership only have a small effect on contributions to the public good. We do not find significant differences in contributions for exogenous and self-selected leadership. Leaders seem to need additional instruments to be more effective when benefits are heterogeneous.

Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to attend to contemporary problems of globalization. I distinguish the standard economic approach to public goods as a supposedly value-neutral technique to coordinate economic activity between states and markets from a political conception of human rights law that empowers individuals to partake in the definition of the public good. On this basis, I contend that framing global public goods and universal human rights in terms of interests and values that "we all" hold in common tends to conceal or evade conflicts about their proper interpretation and implementation. This raises important normative questions with regard to the political and legal accountability of global ordering in both domains. The public goods approach has responded to this problem through extending the scope of political jurisdiction over public goods to encompass all those "affected" by their costs and benefits. This finds its counterpart in attempts in the human rights debate to legally account for the global human rights impacts of public goods through extending human rights jurisdiction beyond state territory. By way of conclusion I contend that both approaches are indicative of a "horizontal" transformation of statehood under conditions of globalization aimed at recovering the public good beyond the international order of states. (author's abstract)

The article aims at giving a comprehensive overview on controlling communicable diseases (CCD) and discusses the implications of providing CCD as a global public good (GPG). After a short introductory summary of the history of CCD, Sections "PUBLIC (COMMON) GOODS" and "GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS" offer a concise definition of the concepts of "public goods" and "global public goods". Sections "INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (1969–2005) AS A GPG" and "IHR (2005) AND CCD" critically analyse the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) as a means to provide CCD as a GPG, and argues that it falls short of that goal as (a) many countries are not able to provide the "Core Capacity Requirements for Surveillance and Response" because of severe deficits of their health systems, (b) the IHR do not include HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, etc. which are a constant threat in infested regions (and to international transmission) and may be called "chronic infectious diseases" and (c) ignore the issue of fighting antimicrobial resistance. Therefore, full global health security (accepting the highest attainable standard of health as a human right) needs an integrated CCD which implied that CCD is provided as a GPG, including minimal standards of health everywhere, a "One-Health" approach, and the perspective of "Health in All Policies" (Section "TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AS A GPG"). Section "FINANCE OF CCD" discusses the dimension of financing CCD as a GPG and poses the question whether an enhanced transnational norm-building and solidarity can be expected. Improving CCD is not only one step towards the goal of "one healthy world", but also depends on a comprehensive improvement of health services.

The operation of moral incentives in the area of labor organization is described in the context of the Cuban model in its primary reliance on moral incentives over material ones, both for intensifying given work & for raising total man-hours to various socially needed tasks. In the allocative-incentive mechanism of moral incentives, a nation must abolish the labor market with its highly graduated income differentials. How Cuba has done this between 1960 & 1969 by means of the mechanism of moral prizes & titles & administrative assignment of labor is examined in detail. Since the empirical measure of the success of moral stimulation is decided by the shift in the structure of production & consumption in favor of goods from that of a private to a public nature, the way that Cuba has replaced the market as a main allocator of workers is discussed. The organization of socialist emulation in one of the main organizations used as means for institutionalizing the mechanism of moral incentives. The immediate aim of the administrators of this complex system is to increase the supply of labor & skills in various sectors & guide their deployment according to the plan's social priorities. Other labor allocating substitutes for the absent labor market are the Ministry of Labor & the army. As far as the Cuban wage scheme being still varied, it has no real effect as market allocator because money wage incomes can not be realized in the consumer goods sector. One way, then, that a country can abolish the use of material incentives is by an equalitarian physical distribution of consumer goods. Prizes can be regarded as "the money of moral incentives." Since full & overfull employment is the more likely situation than underemployment under a system of moral incentives, the efficiency of moral incentives seems to have been proven in Cuba in recent years. 2 Scales, 1 Chart. S. Coler.

We present an experiment that models a repeated public good provision setting where the policy maker or manager does not have perfect control over information flows. Rather, information seeking can be affected by changing the information default as well as the price of information. The default is one either with or without information about others' contributions, and having information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. When information comes without a financial incentive or even is financially beneficial, almost all subjects choose to have the information, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information about the others' contributions leads to a slower unravelling of cooperation, independent of the financial incentives of having information. This slower unravelling is explained by the beliefs about others' contributions in these treatments. A secondary informational default effect appears to take place. When the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often but, conditional on financial incentives, they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.